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"In a subsystem such as Latin America, internal changes cannot be fully explained
without assessing the role played by the region's preeminent power [the United States of
America]" (Kaufman, 1988: 3). The overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens
by the Chilean military cannot be fully examined without taking into account the involvement of
the United States government. From 1969 to 1973, actions, both overt and covert, taken by U.S.
Department of the Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. military promoted
economic chaos, strikes, and subsequently the military coup that overthrew the Allende regime.
The involvement of the United States government in Chile during the decades of the
1960s and 70s has been one of the most controversial issues in U.S. foreign policy. It has brought
the nature of U.S. foreign policy into question; specifically, a policy that attempts to change the
outcome of domestic politics in a foreign country. It has brought about fundamental questions
with regard to the legitimacy of clandestine operations and, for that matter, of the CIA itself.
Also, the Chilean case has brought about investigation of the influence of multinational
corporations and other private groups on U.S. foreign policy.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1950s
The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States (CIA) began distribution of
propaganda in Chile as early as the 1950s. The CIA had taken a very active role in the Chilean
media and in supporting Chilean political parties, labor unions, and student, worker, women, and
peasant groups. These activities were facilitated by Chile's open, democratic system. However,
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they were unde1iaken with such zeal because Chile, also, was home to the largest, best-organized
Communist party in the Western Hemisphere (Sigmund, 1988: 158). Thus, during the Cold War
years, Chile's political trends were closely monitored by the agency. In 1958, a coalition made
up of the Socialist and Communist parties, with Salvador Allende as their candidate, nearly
seized the presidency. After this unexpected blow, the CIA increased its already significant
involvement in Chilean politics (Chile & Allende, 1974: 13; Treverton, 1987: 18).

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1960s
1n the presidential election of 1964, President Kennedy funneled $2.6 million, by way of

the Catholic Church, into Christian Democratic candidate's campaign, Eduardo Frei Montalvo.
The Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem6crata Cristiano: PDC) had been traditionally the
majority party (Clark and Stevens, 1977: 25; Chile & Allende, 1974: 13). The CIA assisted the
PDC in running an American-style campaign, complete with polls and voter participation drives.
This was in addition to leaflets, campaign posters, and other propaganda. The campaign was
managed from Washington by an interagency election committee, involving White House, State
Department, and CIA officials. Due to his U.S.-assisted campaign, Frei won the election with
56.09% of the vote, beating Salvador Allende who received 38.93% of the vote (Chile &
Allende, 1974: 13; U.S. Senate, 1975: 3, 5). Money, also, was fmmeled into other political
parties before and after the election (Sigmund, 1988: 158; Treverton, 1987: 20).
U.S. involvement continued in Chile in 1965, when a total of $175,000 was used to
influence the Chilean congressional elections, and twice that amount was spent in the 1969
congressional elections (Kaufman, 1988: 208; Sigmund, 1988: 158; Treverton, 1987: 21). By the
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late- l 960s, the CIA had a considerable history of involvement in Chile. The U.S. government
had gone so far as to openly support the reformist goals of the Christian Democratic government.
Then. in 1969, U.S. participation decreased due to Nixon's low-profile policy in Latin America
(Johnson, 1973: 214; Sigmund, 1988: 158).

PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE: 1970-73
THE 1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Chilean Political Situation

In 1970, Chilean President Eduardo Frei completed his six-year term as president. He had
been widely popular, but was ineligible for reelection because the Chilean constitution did not
allow a president to serve consecutive terms (Treverton, 1987: 104; U.S. Senate, 1973:2).
Therefore, there were three major candidates vying for the presidency. The first, Dr. Salvador
Allende, a self-proclaimed Marxist, was making his fomih attempt at the presidency as the
candidate of the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular: UP). The UP was made up of the Socialists,
Communists, Radial parties, the Popular Independent Alliance and the Unified Movement of
Poplar Action. Their joint platform included fighting imperialism, the bourgeoisie, and

latifundistas (large land owners), nationalizing mining firms, expropriating large monopolies and
accelerating agrarian reform. The second candidate, Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, served as
president before Frei. This time, he ran as an Independent, candidate of the right-wing National
Party which was a fusion of the Conservative and Liberal parties. The third was Radomiro Tomic
Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democrat Party (U.S. Senate, 1973: 2; Chile &
Allende, 1974: 2, 19).
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"Spoiling Operations"

Tbe CIA believed that Alessandri stood the best chance against Allende. Those working
in the station in Santiago wanted to run an U.S.-type campaign in Alessandri's behalf as had been
done for Frei. However, the CIA proposal to support Alessandri was not given much
consideration because of Nixon's low-profile policy. Besides, the low-profile policy had caused
the CIA station and embassy in Santiago to be out of contact with the right-wing parties. So, both
the U.S. embassy and CIA station agreed to recommend what was called "spoiling operations."
The 40 Committee---an interagency committee in charge of reviewing major covert action
proposals---- authorized $135,000 for "spoiling" activities. These involved propaganda and other
activities to discourage Allende's victory, but, made financing Alessandri's campaign off limits.
During the election campaign, the CIA generated at least one anti-Allende editorial a day in El
Mercucio, the major Santiago daily newspaper. In addition, the CIA subsidized wire services,

magazines for intellectual circles, and other newspapers (Kaufman, 1988:6; Treverton, 1987: 14,
15,18,102).
The 40 Committee, which was responsible for authorizing the spoiling activities, had
been formed to coordinate covert operations within the executive branch. The committee was
renamed twice in an ineffectual attempt to maintain secrecy (previous names were the Special
Group and 303 Committee). It was made up of the director of central intelligence, the
undersecretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, and the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was chaired by the president's national security adviser
(Sigmund, 1988: 159-160; Treverton, 1987: 19).
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In June 1970, American ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-part
proposal to the 40 Committee which asked for an increase in funding for the "spoiling
operations", and $500,000 for a contingency plan to influence the outcome of the Chilean
Congress's vote in case of a plurality. The 40 committee approved the increase in funding and
debated the approval of the contingency plan. One member of the 40 Committee in particular, the
undersecretary of state, strongly protested the contingency plan (Treverton, 1987: 102).
Foreign corporations, especially U.S. corporations, dominated much of the Chilean
economy in the decades preceding Allende's election. Allende's socialist regime, albeit
democratically elected, posed a large threat to these corporations. As early as April of 1969, the
Business Council on Latin America offered $500,000 to any anti-Allende campaign (Kaufman,
1988: 20, 24-25). ITT, alone, gave $350,000 to the Alessandri campaign. A total of $700,000
was contributed to Alessandri's campaign from the U.S. business community (Clark and Stevens,
1977: 25; Sigmund, 160).
The Elections

On September 4, 1970, Allende won a plurality of the votes in the presidential election by
a mere 39,000 votes; only 1.2% more than Alessandri. However, this did not assure him the
presidency. According to the Chilean constitution, the congress was to determine which of the
top two candidates would be president in the case of a plurality. Allende's victory, even though a
plurality, alarmed many of the U.S. officials. Top U.S. officials had not been very concerned
about the election because they had expected an Alessandri victory (Sigmund, 1988: 161; U.S.
Senate, 1973: 2).
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CONGRESSIONAL CONFIRMATION
Four days after the election, the 40 Committee met. One of the topics discussed was the
"pros and cons of a military coup organized with U.S. assistance" (Treverton, 1987: 103). Both
the embassy and the CIA station in Santiago doubted the possibility of a coup. Among the
contacts they had in the Chilean military, there was no one promising. This is not to mention the
largest obstacle, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean military, General Rene Schneider. The
general was a staunch constitutionalist, who would clearly not support, nor allow a coup. Under
these conditions the embassy discouraged pursuing the coup proposal (Sigmund, 1988: 161;
Treverton, 1987: 103).

Track I
On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss what would later be called Track I.
The committee considered the possibility of having a "constitutional coup." In such a case, Frei
would resign leaving the government in hands of a military cabinet. They would, then, call for
new elections which would, constitutionally, allow popular president Frei to run because the
military cabinet would serve as an interim govermnent. Another alternative of Track I was the
bribing of the Chilean congress to vote Alessandri into office. The 40 committee, appropriated
$250,000 to be used in the execution of these two proposals, but it was money that was never
used (Sigmund, 1988: 161; Treverton, 1987: 104).

Track II
A few days after the election, Mr. McCone, former director of the CIA, and, at that time,
consultant to the CIA and a Director ofITT, communicated to National Security Adviser (NSA),
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Henry Kissinger, and the Director of the CIA, Richard Helms that International Telephone and
Telegraph (ITT) would like to contribute $1 million to any anti-Allende campaign the United
States might be planning. The CIA did not accept the money, but let Mr. McCone know how it
could be contributed to Alessandri's election campaign (Clark and Stevens, 1977: 25; U.S.
Senate, 1973: 4-5).
On September 15, President Nixon met with Richard Helms. Nixon, avid about the
Allende tlu·eat, ordered Helms, "Leave no stone unturned in the attempt to block Allende's
confirmation by any means necessary ...make the economy scream!" (Kaufman, 1988: 8-9;
Treverton, 1987: 105). Track II originated from President Nixon's orders to Helms. The
objectives of Track II were to cut off lines of credit, to press multinational corporations to curtail
investment, and to press other nations to do likewise. Economic chaos, the Nixon administration
hoped, would make the Chilean military act against Allende. Nixon was fully intent on keeping
Salvador Allende out of office. In order to carry out the Track II plan, the CIA established a
separate task force. In Santiago, the only people aware of the aggressive Track II plot were the
U.S. Army attache, CIA station chief, and his deputy. Nixon made clear that neither the State nor
the Defense departments were to know (Kaufman, 1988: 7; Sigmund, 1988: 161; Treverton,
1987: 99, 104-105, 106)
To manage the economic squeeze another interagency, parallel to the 40 Committee, was
formed. This committee was composed of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division chief and
representatives from the State Department, the National Security Council (NSC), and Treasury
Department(Treverton,

1987: 105).
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Helms perceived Nixon's orders as a "blank check." The special task force created for the
operation was to receive instruction directly from headquarters, not from the station in Santiago.
They were given the specific duties of collecting intelligence on coup-minded officers, creating a
coup climate through propaganda and terrorist activities, and informing the Chilean military of
U.S. support for a coup (Kaufman, 1988: 8; Treverton, 1987: 105). As part of Track II, the CIA
orchestrated strikes and food shortages which contributed to the civic chaos that brought about
the coup against Allende (CIA: Secret Warriors, 1997).
The difference between the two tracks was not that Track II involved a coup and Track I
did not. Essentially, they both had the same objective of keeping Allende out of office. The
difference was in the way they went about it. Track I simply encouraged Frei to resign in favor of
a "constitutional coup". On the other hand, Track II involved actively contacting members of the
Chilean military to promote a coup that could destroy the Chilean Democracy (Kaufman, 1988:
7; Treverton, 1987: 104, 105) However, the U.S. lacked the cooperation of Frei which made
Track I unworkable. The aims of Track II were blocked by Schneider. The embassy, in a fruitless
attempt, attempted to persuade President Frei to send Schneider out of the country. Even so,
feeling compelled to remove Schneider because of the pressure applied by Nixon, the CIA
pressed forward with plans to carry out Track II (Treverton, 1987: 107, 127, 128).
The U.S. army attache was successful in find two Chilean officers who wanted a coup:
Brigadier General Roberto Viaux and commander of the Santiago garrison, General Camilio
Valenzuela (Treverton, 1987: 128). Valenzuela presented the U.S. with a plan for the abduction
of Schneider and, with three other senior officers, a coup d'etat against the Allende regime. In a
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complicated plan, Valenzuela's men would capture Schneider after a dinner event. The first and,
then, a second plan failed. On the third attempt, Schneider was finally intercepted, but shot
instead of abducted. Valenzuela received $50,000 in payment for the attempted abduction.
Schneider was hospitalized. In response to the incident, the CIA special task force sent this
message to headquarters: "All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording Armed
Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are willing to follow
Valenzuela's scenario" (Treverton, 1987: 130-131).
Allende's confirmation as president of Chile by the congress, was proceeded by
Alessandri's withdrawal from the running (Chile & Allende, 1974: 34). Schneider died in a
Santiago hospital the day following the confirmation. The death of Schneider, a staunch
constitutionalist, only made the Chileans respect the constitutional process more. With high
emotions of patriotism among the military personnel brought on by Schneider's death,
Valenzuela and his conspirators were fearful of following through with the coup plot (Sigmund,
1988: 162). Track II had failed--or had it? The U.S. economic pressures, propaganda, and
subversive activities of Track II continued until the 1973 coup that kill Allende. Track II was not
over.

THE COUP D'ETAT
Nationalization of Multinational Corporations

In 1971, the Chilean congress passed a constitutional amendment that gave the president
power to nationalize U.S. businesses in Chile. President Allende started with the copper
companies and, then, International Telephone & Telegraph. To calculate the amount of
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compensation that would be paid to the U.S. companies, the Controller General of Chile
evaluated the value of the copper companies assets in Chile. After discounting taxes, fines, and
depreciation of machines, the controller general determined that U.S. corporations owned Chile
money. Therefore, no indemnity was given to the U.S. companies (Chile & Allende, 1974: 53;
U.S. House of Representatives, 1971: 11; U.S. Senate, 1973: 11).
U.S. multinational corporations in Chile reacted to nationalization of their assets, for the
most part, individually, rather than collectively. The large business groups urged Nixon to
sanction Chile if reasonable compensation was not paid. These large corporations, of course,
demanded sanctions because they stood to lose a lot more than there smaller counterparts:
Anaconda, Ford, ITT, Kennecott, Ralston Purina, and others (New Chile, 1973: 189). A few
smaller companies were able to reach satisfactory agreements (Kaufman, 1988: 20). In response
to the nationalization of assets of U.S. multinational corporations, Nixon announced the new
U.S. "hardline" policy in 1972. The policy stated that any nation expropriating "a significant U.S.
interest" without making reasonable compensation will not be extended new U.S. bilateral
economic assistance (New Chile, 1973: 189). Such sanctions were unofficially imposed on Chile
before Nixon's announcement.
Economic Squeeze on Chile
In November 1970, a national security decision memorandum was sent out to government
lending institutions that called for the termination of any new economic assistance. The
economic squeeze had two parts: one, cut off credit to Chile; and two, demand payment for
previous debt. During this time, U.S. Export-Import Bank credits ceased. Inter-American
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Development Bank (IDB) made no more than two small loans to Chilean universities. The World
Bank, since its founding, had granted Chile 18 loans, totaling $234 million. However, during the
three years Allende occupied the presidency, the World Bank did not grant a single loan. U.S.
private bank lending to Chile declined substantially, but did not push for a complete economic
blockade because they feared that it might prevent them from receiving a return on their already
substantial investments (Kaufman, 1988: 24; Sigmund, 1988: 163). By October 1971, all U.S.
government-related aid programs were held up for review, except military aid (Johnson, 1973:
214). Chile was able to get credit from Western European and Latin American countries, the
USSR, and Eastern Europe. However, these were small and did not calm the growing economic
crisis (Sigmund, 1988: 163).
Economically, Chile had a long history of dependence on the U.S. Ever since 1962, when
the Alliance for Progress was formed, U.S. loans had flown into Chile creating a "showplace for
' democracy" Q:-IewChile, 1973: 180-181 ). The technology in Chile was almost exclusively US.produced, thus making Chile dependent on the U.S. for replacement paiis. Therefore, the U.S.precipitated "credit squeeze", jointly with trade sanctions, was especially formidable in that it left
Chilean industries without money and replacement parts (Johnson, 1973: 214). In December of
1972, in a speech before the United Nations, Allende decried the U.S. economic sanctions,
referring to them as an "invisible blockade" against Chile (Johnson, 1973: 215; Sigmund, 1988:
163).
As Allende's term went on the economic crisis deepen. Even before 1971 was over, 5,000
housewives marched in Santiago streets to protest Allende's policies and Fidel Castro's visit to
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Chile (Chile & Allende, 1974: 48). This was followed by many other strikes and up risings--by
shopkeepers, truckers, miners and many other organized groups in Chile that opposed Allende. In
1972, the economic situation worsened to the point that Allende threatened Chile with mandatory
food rationing. The costs of food imports reached 18 percent of the nation's export earnings
(Jordan, 1038). This and other economic problems caused runaway inflation that, by mid-1973,
reached 323% (Sigmund, 1988: 164).
On September 11, 1973, President Allende found the presidential palace surrounded by
Chilean military forces. Allende was given an ultimatum to resign or die. Allende refused to
resign and urged workers to continue at their employment rather than obeying the military. At
noon air force planes bombed the presidential palace. A four-man military junta seized control of
the Chilean government. The following day, the junta announced that Allende committed suicide
in his office during the assault on the presidential palace (Chile & Allende, 1974:141).

ANALYSIS
RATIONAL & INCREMENTAL DECISION MAKING MODELS
Brewer, in his book, American Foreign Policy, states that the rational decision making
model is a "useful starting point" in evaluating policy formation (1992: 26). Brewer continues by
saying that this model can only be useful if it is used as a general guideline and not "literally or
exclusively" (1992: 27). So this analysis will begin with the rational decision making model, but
only as a general guideline to evaluate U.S. foreign policy toward Chile from 1970-1973. The
rational decision model will not be used "exclusively", but as a framework in which elements of
the incremental decision making model will be brought in.
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Brewer states that the criterion for the rational decision making model are as follows:
first. clearly specified goals; second, decision maker should have accurate and comprehensive
information about the nature of the threat; third, all major alternatives must be considered; fourth,
all the alternatives must be evaluated; and finally, the most advantageous must be picked (1992:

Clearly Specified Goals

To evaluate the first criteria in terms of U.S. policy toward Allende it is important to first
define who set the goals. The actions against the Allende government were authorized and
supervised by the President of the United States and members of the 40 Committee. Four
executive agencies were represented on the 40 Committee besides the CIA, ----State, Defense,
the military chiefs, and the national security adviser and staff (CIA: Secret Warriors, 1997;
Sigmund, 1988: 159-160; Treverton, 1987: 19). Other decision makers who were involved in
proposing much of the actions against the Allende regime were: Ambassador Korry, the CIA
station chief, and the Department of the Treasury. Non governmental actors that influenced
policy toward Chile were the U.S. multinational corporations. These non governmental actors
were involved in policy formation by outright solicitation or through the Treasury (Kaufman,
1988: 12; U.S. Senate, 1973: 20). They were also involved in policy implementation by joining
in the economic pressures on Chile iliew Chile, 1973: 193).
Congress was involved through a few key members of the Armed Services and
Appropriations committees of the two houses. However, they only received general information
in connection with the budget process. The important covert operations were not reported to
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Congress members in much detail and sometimes were passed on long after the operations had
happened (Kaufman, 1988: 16).
Among U.S. decision makers, there was one consensual goal: to keep Allende from the
presidency. This was considered tantamount to stopping the spread of Communism throughout
Latin America to some. However, they each had their individual motivations: political and
strategic, emotional, or financial.
Keeping Dr. Allende from occupying the presidency was an attainable goal. United
States' covert involvement had kept Salvador Allende out of office, previously, in the 1964
presidential elections. However, the 1970 presidential elections became a different scenario. This
is due mainly to President Nixon's low-profile policy. The policy caused the U.S. to use a
different propaganda strategy than had been used in 1964. This will be discussed in more detail
below.
Definition of Threat

The election of Salvador Allende and "the fall of Chile to Communism", was interpreted
differently depending on the decision maker. Allende had openly declared his socialist intentions
for years Ct:l:ewChile, 1973: 19). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the election of Allende
posed a real threat in the eyes of those that felt like a socialist Chile jeopardized the interests or
security of the United States. U.S. policy makers perceived Allende's Socialist policies as a
threat on different levels. As stated before, they perceived them politically and strategically,
emotionally, or financially. How the actors view the threat is important in explaining their
policies.
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Kissinger mostly saw Allende's socialist democracy as a political or strategic threat
(Kaufman, 1988: 4). It was a strategic risk because Kissinger did not trust the peoples of the
Third World to make their own decisions; they are too easily swayed by emotion. It was his
perception that the ideologies of nationalism and communism were too contagious to be allowed
to be freely disseminated among the ignorant peoples of South America. Kissinger said this
about Chile, " ...

a major Latin American country, a communist government joining for

example Argentina which is already deeply divided ... joining Peru which has already been
heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia which has also
gone in a more leftist anti-U.S. direction" (Kaufman, 1988: 4-5; Treverton, 1987: 11).
President Nixon, "impulsive and emotional", made policy decisions toward Chile
whimsically (Sigmund, 1988: 162). Nixon, in his anti-Communist fanaticism, felt that there
would be a Chilean-Cuban conspiracy to create a "red sandwich" which Nixon described as
spreading "violence, terrorism, and revolution throughout Latin America" (Kaufman, 1988: 4).
Ambassador Edward Korry had strong emotional tries to different policy goals. Korry is
"an intense man," he was "deeply bruised" by involvement in Chile (Treverton, 1987: 99). He
originally was opposed to covertly intervening in the Chilean presidential elections of 1970.
However, Henry Heckscher, CIA station chief in Santiago, knew how to play on his emotions.
Korry had been a journalist in Eastern Europe and has witness the oppressiveness of
Communism there. When Korry opposed covert involvement in the elections, Heckscher asked,
"Do you want to be responsible for electing a Communist as president of Chile?" (Treverton,
1987: 100, emphasis added). Kon-y's deep emotional involvement made him easily manipulated
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(Treverton, 1987: 99-10 l ).
Korry to a certain extent, also, looked at the policy goal as financial in nature. Korry, a
patriot, felt like he was a "fiduciary" for the U.S. public and private investors in Chile and felt
responsible for the loss of U.S. capital (Treverton, 1987: 101).
When the Chilean government nationalized Chiltelco (telephone company in Chile of
which ITT owned 70%), ITT lost approximately $153 million (U.S. Senate, 1973: 13). In
addition, the corporation owned two hotels, a telephone directory service, and an international
telegraph company (Kaufman, 1988:21). When ITT approached the U.S. govenm1ent to
contribute money to any anti-Allende campaign, it undoubtably wanted policy goals that
addressed U.S. financial investments in Chile.
The ambassador and the CIA station in Santiago began considering the U.S. position in
the 1970 presidential election in 1969. However, president Nixon and his advisers were mostly
ambivalent toward the Chilean situation until it was too late to influence the outcome in a
significant way (Sigmund, 1988: 160). The only actions taken before the election were the
spoiling operations proposed by the CIA station and the embassy. The more aggressive policies
of Track 1 and II were not implemented until after the election.
Allende and his supporters saw the traditional, ruling Chilean regime and the U.S. as
threats to their economic and political well-being. He and his supporters did not perceive
themselves as a threat to the U.S. They felt justified in nationalizing U.S. interests iliew Chile,
1973: 18). However, Chile was not unanimously in support of Allende; only 3 6.3% of the
electorate put him into office (U.S. Senate, 1973: 2). There were many Chileans that considered
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Allende as a threat to the country. Feelings toward Allende and his policies divided the Chilean
nation (Jordan, 1973: 1038; New Chile, 1973: 18).
Major Alternatives Considered

U.S. policy makers considered five major alternatives to keep Allende out of the Chilean
presidential office: The first was running a U.S.-style campaign for one of the opposition
candidates. This would have included public polling and voter-registration and get-out-and-vote
drives, along with poster, leaflets and other propaganda. This alternative was considered by the
CIA station in Santiago. Their proposal to support Alessandri directly was not give much
attention for two reasons. First, it was not in harmony with Nixon's low-profile policy. Second,
top U.S. officials misjudged Alessandri's popularity mainly due to CIA-conducted polls that
showed Alessandri's support around 40 percent.
The second alternative was referred to as the "Alessandri Formula." This plan had to do
with Alessandri's September 9th announcement that he would resign if voted into office by the
Chilean congress. If he did this, there would have to be fresh elections in which popular
President Frei could enter because of Alessandri's interim occupation of the office (Chile &
Allende, 1974: 32; Treverton, 1987: 103, 104; U.S. Senate, 1973: 4).
The third alternative, the "Frei gambit", and the fourth, bribing the Chilean congress,
were both found under the umbrella word, Track I. The "Frei gambit", like the "Alessandri
Formula", tried to find a way around the constitutional rule that Frei cannot succeed himself.
This plan involved Frei's resignation from the presidency to a military cabinet that would call for
fresh elections. That way a military interim government would, constitutionally, allow Frei to
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run again (Treverton, 1987: 104)
The fourth alternative was a contingency plan to the "Frei gambit"proposed by
Ambassador Korry. In the case of a plurality, the Chilean congress could be bribed into voting
for Alessandri, the runner up in the Chilean presidential election.
The fifth alternative, later named Track II, came about in Nixon's fury over Allende's
victory in the September election. This plan was to create a coup climate by causing economic
and civic chaos. This alternative, as previously discussed, involved propaganda, subversion, and
cutthroat economic policies with the intent to cause a coup.
The "Frei gambit" and the "Alessandri Formula" were the only alternatives that were
considered simultaneously. The first alternative could have only been considered previous to the
election. Bribing the Chilean congress was just a contingency plan in the case that the second and
third alternatives failed. The coup alternative was not result of plaiming, but was a result of
Nixon's whims. Few were aware of it when it was implemented.
Evaluate Alternatives

It is important to note that the rational decision making model assumes that all of the
alternatives are looked at thoroughly and considered jointly in order to decide which was the
most rational (Brewer, 1992: 25). However, the policies toward Allende were considered
individually in most cases and were not evaluated thoroughly. The incremental decision making
model suggests that policy makers deal with problems on a case by case basis as they arise
(Brewer 1992: 27). The incremental model describes the U.S. policy makers decisions in the
Allende case well. This is mainly due to the fact that the alternatives were not considered at one
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beginning point, under the same circumstances, but were developed as the situation with Allende
progressed.
The first alternative considered by U.S. decision makers involved the CIA running the
campaign of a candidate that opposed Allende, as had been done in 1964 with Frei. As the 1970
presidential elections approached, the CIA station in Santiago proposed assisting Alessandri with
his campaign. However, Nixon's Latin America low-profile policy had caused the CIA to lose
direct contact with conservative parties (Sigmund, 1988: 158). Therefore, working on the
conservative candidate's campaign was not a viable option. In 1964, millions of U.S. dollars
went to Eduardo Frei's campaign, as well as, anticommunist propaganda (Sigmund, 1988: 166).
The U.S. campaign for Frei provided a positive alternative to the "communist" candidate,
Allende. The primary reason that U.S. propaganda efforts in 1970 were not as effective as those
used in I 964 is because the 1970 propaganda showed communism as evil but provided no
positive alternative. That is to say that the 1970 efforts were only anti-Allende and not proanybody. Nixon, whose low-profile policy inhibited contact with the conservative parties, later,
ironically criticized the CIA and the State Department for not supporting a particular candidate in
their propaganda campaign (Kaufman, 1988: 7; Sigmund, 1988: 160). If decision makers had
implemented a campaign supporting Alessandri, Track 1 and Track II may have never been
necessary. The next four alternatives were formed as the threat escalated from Allende running
for president, to Allende waiting to be confirmed president by the Chilean congress.
The second U.S. policy alternative, the "Alessandri Formula," depended completely on
Alessandri' s promise to resign. The dubiousness of a plan that depended on Alessandri was
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displayed when he unexpectedly withdrew from the congressional confirmation vote (Chile &
Allende, 1974: 34) It also depended on the luck that the Chilean congress would vote Alessandri
into the office. This alternative had no foundation; it relied too much on chance.
The third policy alternative the "Frei Gambit", even more than the "Alessandri Formula",
depended heavily on a dubious individual. Frei never showed interest in resigning or serving
another term as U.S. officials had assumed (Treverton 106). Even so the 40 Committee set aside
$250,000 for this plan (Treverton, 1987: 104). Furthermore, what assurance would the U.S. have
that the military would give up control of the government once they had control. Nevertheless,
that issue was most likely inconsequential to the top U.S. officials, whose ultimate goal was to
only keep Salvador Allende out of office.
The fourth policy alternative, the bribing of the Chilean congress, was proposed as a
contingency plan to the "Frei Gambit". This plan was approved by the 40 Committee and
evaluated by the Santiago team. After a little bit of feedback from Chilean congress members,
both the embassy and the CIA station decided this plan would backfire (Treverton, 1987: 104).
The fifth policy alternative, the coup plot, was decided upon and implemented behind the
back of many of the decision makers. Many members of the 40 Committee, as well as the
embassy, were not aware of its implementation. It violated the basic norms of American
diplomacy. The rational decision making model, as one of its flaws, does not take president
Nixon's personality into account (Brewer, 1992: 26). As part of this analysis some decision
makers' feelings about the Track II policy will be evaluated.
Nixon, for example, as well as his NSA, believed that the ousting of Chilean President
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Salvador Allende and stopping the threat of another Communist nation in the Western
Hemisphere was necessary at any cost, even if that meant instigating a coup against Allende.
"Track II was not evitable it resulted from a decision whose specifics owed much to President
Nixon's personal involvement" (Treverton, 1987: 103). Kissinger's flippant attitude about U.S.
involvement in Chile is illustrated in this comment: "I don't see why the United States should
stand by and let Chile go communist merely due to the stupidity of it own people" (Treverton,
1987, 11).
On the contrary, the Under Secretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson, originally unaware of
Track ll, did not believe that the overthrow of Allende or anything merited meddling in Chilean
politics (Treverton, 1987: 102). In the case of Ambassador Korry, also unaware of Track II, the
idea of meddling in the media and bribing the Chilean Congress were fine, and even allowing the
Frei to cause a coup was acceptable, but a U.S.-initiated coup over stepping bounds (Treverton,
I 987: 99-100).

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOST RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE
Track II originally failed, but its policies eventually contributed in causing the coup
against Allende which had been the final goal of policy makers. This paper has already shown
that the policy goals were not evaluated by policy makers with a rational model approach. But,
was Track II the most rational decision, anyway? Was it worth the consequences of ardent,
disapproving public opinion inside and outside the U.S., extensive congressional investigations
into the actions of ITT and the CIA concerning Chile, new legislation restricting the use of
private funds in government and greatly increasing congressional oversight of the CIA?
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CIA substantially (U.S. Senate, 1975: 2).
"The Church Hearings were a watershed; permanent congressional committees were set
up to oversee the agency. The president's secret warriors were no longer above the law or beyond
the reach of public scrutiny. The glory days were over" (CIA: Secret Warriors, 1997).
Conclusion

The overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende cannot be solely or even mostly
contributed to U.S. actors. However, any evaluation of Allende's fall must include the U.S. role.
The involvement of the United States was key to augmenting the political and social divisions
that already existed in Chile. In particular, the U.S.-orchestrated economic squeeze deteriorated
an already struggling Chilean economy, in this manner, accentuating the political and social
divisions. Furthermore, because of Track II, U.S. aroused the Chilean military's interest in a
coup by stimulating coup-minded individuals and offering U.S. support.
The policies of the U.S. government during the Allende's government followed an
incremental decision model in that the policies were reactions to events rather than thorough
analysis of the situation followed by implementation. The policy of the U.S. can be described as
an under-reaction, followed by an over reaction. That is, the U.S. needed to have devised a plan
well in advance to the elections and have taken an active role in supporting a candidate as it had
done in 1964. In 1970, top Washington officials ignored the Allende threat until he had been
elected. Track II, which came after the elections, was an over reaction. Allende, faced enough
opposition in his own country to eventually lead to his ousting or at least a tempering of his
Socialist policies. However, Track II could be better called a "Nixon foreign policy" rather than a
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Results

Admittedly, the media has taken advantage of the myths about CIA involvement and the
involvement of U.S. multinational corporations in Chile during the Allende years, 1970-1973.
Notwithstanding if what the public understands about U.S. involvement in Chile is reality or
myth, the public outcry has brought about important changes in the way the CIA and the
president are able to conduct covert operations.
In 1973, before the coup, the United States Senate investigated the role of ITT in U.S.
foreign policy towards Chile. It found that ITT had attempted to funnel money into campaigns
that opposed Allende in the 1970 presidential elections. It attempted to use the CIA as a vehicle
for funneling this money. The CIA did not directly channel the money for ITT, but informed ITT
on how to put money into campaigns opposing Allende. ITT had also tried to convince other
corporations to join it in forming an economic blockade (U.S. Senate, 1973; 16-17). Besides
public embarrassment over ITT's actions and involvement with the CIA, this has brought about
legislation that restricts the use of private funds by the U.S. government.
In 1975, the U.S. Senate investigated the CIA's role in Chile during the Allende regime.
These hearings became known as the Church hearings, named after Senator Frank Church. The
investigation found that the CIA had been involved in subversive actions, but was not directly
involved in the coup itself (Senate, 1975: 28-29). The involvement of the CIA in the domestic
politics of another country was discrediting enough. However, the revelations that the CIA had
attempted to covertly overthrow a foreign government led to the National Security Acts. These
were the first of several pieces of legislation that increased the congressional oversight of the
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